Leo Michel, Senior Research Fellow, Institute for National Strategic Studies
National Defense University
I would like to offer remarks in two areas:
- first, to explain briefly the nature of, and lessons learned from, the National Security Strategy process in the United States; and
- second, to offer a few personal observations on the CDU-CSU paper on a National Security Strategy for Germany.
In 1986, the Congress approved, and President Reagan signed into law, the Goldwater-Nichols Act—the most comprehensive reform of the U.S. defense structures since 1947.
The law strengthened civilian control of the Department of Defense, improved military advice to civilian leadership, and forced the various military services to plan, train, equip, deploy and operate forces jointly rather than focus on their parochial service interests.
The law, which remains in force, also requires the President to prepare an annual report on the U.S. national security strategy that includes detailed discussion of:
- The worldwide interests and objectives vital to U.S. national security;
- The foreign policy, worldwide commitments, and national defense capabilities necessary to implement the strategy;
- The proposed short-term and long-term uses of political, economic, military, and other elements of national power to protect or promote our interests and goals; and
- The adequacy of U.S. capabilities to carry out its strategy.
Moreover, the law requires that President transmit his strategy report at the same time as his proposed budget for the next fiscal year.
Through that provision, the Congress sought to achieve better coherence between national strategy and the allocation of resources necessary to pursue that strategy.
If that’s the concept, how has it worked in practice?
In terms of process, the national security strategies have been prepared in a “top down” manner.
The President’s National Security Advisor, assisted by the National Security Council Staff, generally has kept a tight rein on the drafting process.
Various executive departments, such as Defense, State and Treasury, have been asked to contribute ideas, and the National Security Advisor and his staff might informally consult with influential Members of Congress or eminent non-government personalities.
However, the strategy is widely regarded as the President’s authoritative statement; it is not intended to reflect a consensus view among the Administration, and Congress, and civil society.
Indeed, there is no provision for Congress to debate or approve the strategy, which the White House often has submitted late or—in some years—skipped altogether.
Is this a useful exercise?
Overall, the answer is “yes”—but its utility is far more limited than Congress intended.
On the positive side, the strategy obliges the White House to articulate its view of U.S. national interests and the international strategic context.
This sets the tone of Administration policies, sending important signals to allies, partners, and potential adversaries.
It also engages various domestic constituencies—in think-tanks, universities, media and other private and public associations—to examine and critique the Administration’s product, and to offer alternative views.
Over the long run, this can help build a national consensus on what we are defending or promoting and why.
Each report has had a dominant theme.
The Reagan Administration reports stressed containment of the Soviet Union—at first, stressing military power, but later shifting toward an integration of military, economic and diplomatic elements.
The Clinton Administration reports focused on managing the post-Cold War transition in the former Soviet Union and, increasingly, on transnational threats such as terrorism and proliferation.
But they also expressed a desire to shape the international environment by bolstering economic prosperity and promoting democracy.
The Bush Administration’s first report, published one year after the 9/11 attacks, emphasized the threats of international terrorism and “outlaw regimes;” its discussion of preemption attracted exceptional attention in the United States and overseas.
President Bush wrote a preface to his Administration’s second report in 2006, stating: “America is at war. This is a wartime national security strategy required by the grave challenge we face—the rise of terrorism fueled by an aggressive ideology of hatred and murder.”
However, the report itself is dominated by the theme of “extending freedom across the globe by leading an international effort to end tyranny and to promote effective democracy.”
Nevertheless, many of these national security strategies have fallen short.
Too many have been more descriptive in nature than strategic; they have favored broad statements of intentions and policies rather than establishing clear priorities and explaining trade-offs affecting policy choices and resource allocation.
I should note, as well, that over the past several years, the Presidential-level National Security Strategy has been complemented by a growing number of inter-related strategic documents prepared by other agencies.
These have included, for example, a National Defense Strategy prepared by the Secretary of Defense; a National Military Strategy prepared by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; a National Strategy for Combating Terrorism prepared by the National Security Council; and a National Counterintelligence Strategy prepared by the Director of National Intelligence.
This proliferation of national strategic documents recognizes that the overarching National Security Strategy, while required, cannot satisfy the need for guidance to executive departments on practical implementation.
It also points to a critical question now receiving significant attention in the United States: how can the government better organize itself to prioritize its strategic goals and work together to achieve them?
The current national security system was devised for a Cold War era when national security was largely defined by superpower military competition.
A number of experts, within and outside government, have concluded that system is outdated and ill-suited for a the current complex strategic environment hit by shocks such as 9/11, hurricane Katrina, Iraq and Afghanistan, failed states, cyber attacks, climate change, and pandemic threats.
In recent months, Secretary of Defense Gates has spoken out publicly on this problem.
Referring to Iraq and Afghanistan, he has stated: “one of the most important lessons that has been learned…is that military success is not sufficient. Our efforts must also address economic development, institution building, the rule of law, promoting internal reconciliation, decent governance…..and more. These so-called soft capabilities along with military power are indispensable to any lasting success--indeed, to victory itself as Clausewitz understood it, which is achieving a political objective.”
But Secretary Gates also noted: “America’s national security apparatus, military and civilian, needs to be more adept in operating along a continuum…Bureaucratic barriers that hamper effective action should be rethought and reformed. The disparate strands of our national security apparatus, civilian and military, should be prepared ahead of time to deploy and operate together.”
A serious reform effort is now underway, involving a bipartisan coalition of organizations and some 300 experts from government, the military, universities, foundations, and private industry.
Their goal is to design and recommend to the next Administration and Congress a new national security apparatus based on a rigorous analysis of the obstacles to effective strategic planning and integrated use of the instruments of national power.
If successful, this effort will help ensure that future U.S. national security strategies go beyond public policy statements and actually guide our national security policies, help the President choose wisely among alternative courses of action, and allocate resources accordingly.
This brings me to the CDU-CSU strategy document, where I would offer three observations.
First observation: One of the most difficult dilemmas confronting the United States, Germany, and other allies in dealing with modern-day terrorism is that we may win an unbroken series of tactical victories and yet confront a strategic failure.
In my view, the document correctly recognizes that Germany must take an active and multifaceted approach to fighting terrorism, including but not limited to military operations to neutralize violent actors, and that it must prepare for additional Bundeswehr deployments to stabilize and enforce peace.
In this context, it would be useful to explain the need for equitable participation across the spectrum of military as well as civilian tasks—for example, in Afghanistan.
A second and related observation: the document calls for a strengthening of the cohesion of the European Union, NATO, and the transatlantic partnership, and of course Americans can only welcome this.
But it sheds little light on how and with what means Germany should pursue that goal.
Germany has one set of forces and one defense budget available for NATO, EU, UN or national missions, but how does it see the respective roles of these organizations, and what are Germany’s priorities?
More generally, the goals and policies set out in the document seem rather divorced from the question of capabilities.
If the Bundeswehr and, indeed, civilian agencies will be asked to do more in complex operations, whether in Afghanistan, the Balkans, Africa or elsewhere, does this mean that other missions will be reduced?
If not, how can your military do more with an essentially static level of resources?
Similarly, the document states that “nuclear participation, which has existed for a long time within NATO, guarantees Germany’s influence” with respect to the Alliance’s nuclear deterrence capabilities.
But this begs the question of how that influence will be maintained in the future as existing dual-capable aircraft are gradually retired from service.
Final observation: as the CDU-CSU proposes to create a National Security Council, it might be instructive to look more closely at what is happening in Washington.
The NSC’s role and performance has varied considerably depending on the President’s preferences and the personalities of his key advisors and cabinet members.
In recent years, however, it has been criticized for a number of reasons.
Even with over 200 personnel, the NSC staff can be overwhelmed by the task of trying to ensure coordination among the key departments, especially as the staff has little or no authority over powerful departments to actually direct them to carry out actions.
The NSC, it is said, also provides too little guidance to individual agencies as they develop their own strategies, doctrines, and requirements.
Moreover, it has a limited role in the budgeting process, which is critical to matching resources and strategy across the government; this means that efforts to apply a holistic national security strategy can be frustrated by budget requests that still tend to reflect individual departmental equities and concerns.
Secretary Gates has pointed out, for example, that the State Department budget of approximately $39 billion represents what the Pentagon spends annually for health care—hardly an equitable balance of investment.
While ideas to reform the NSC process are now floating around Washington, many experts are focusing on a “systemic” change toward fostering “horizontal” cooperation among executive branch departments—just as the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act fostered greater cooperation among our military services.
These ideas focus on development of human capital, through expanded opportunities for shared training, exercises, and enhanced exchanges of personnel among our various departments concerned with national security problems.
Congress, too, will need to reconsider its oversight role.
Under existing committee structures, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and its House of Representatives counterpart guard their jurisdiction over the State Department, and the Senate Armed Services Committee and House counterpart oversee the Defense Department.
Separate powerful committees oversee the Department of Homeland Security, intelligence community, and the all-important appropriations process.
In the end, there is relatively little time and effort in Congress to consider a “holistic” approach to national security issues that must now involve two or more departments.
Accomplishing such reforms will be an exceedingly difficult task, but one that we know we must undertake if we are to do a better job in the future, and I suspect this might be difficult in Germany, as well.
In conclusion, the CDU/CSU strategy is a promising start to what hopefully will become a periodic and government-led effort in the future—one that advances a broad national consensus on Germany’s security interests, increases understanding and support for its policy choices, and generates a sustained commitment to devote and properly allocate the necessary resources to implement your policies effectively.
And as you encounter problems along the way, perhaps you will find inspiration in the words of that famous expert on strategy, Mick Jagger of the Rolling Stones, who sings:
“You can’t always get what you want
But if you try real hard
You just might
Get what you need.”
Thank you for your attention.